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This article focuses on governance of the pharmaceutical sector in Israel. It traces the relationships between the
state, industry, and sick funds from before the establishment of National Health Insurance (NHI) in 1995 to the
beginning of this decade, in particular as they have grappled with the challenge of making national formulary
decisions in a rational manner. Subsequent to the introduction of NHI there have been shifts in the modes and mix
of governance. This research shows empirically that a relatively complex mix of hierarchical and network modes of
governance can be successfully established over an extended period of time when flexibility is maintained through
the implementation process. The system for defining and updating a standard basket of health services has coped
well with the challenge of managing a range of difficult and potentially volatile stakeholder relationships in the
pharmaceutical sector and of distancing ministers from controversies of funding and listing decisions. Government
has succeeded in containing drug costs whilst still maintaining a basket of reimbursable drugs that, from an
international perspective, is comprehensive and technologically advanced.
On the other hand, network arrangements appear to have delayed the introduction of suitable accountability
relationships and hindered their development. The state has traditionally played an intermediary role between
unavoidable corporate interests of industry and sick funds, with little transparency and to the detriment of more
pluralistic access to decision making. Governance arrangements in Israel appear to limit the potential and incentive
of the state and the sick funds to realize their potential countervailing powers in subsidy and pricing decisions.
Keywords: Health insurance, Pharmaceutical governance, Pharmaceutical policy, Reimbursement, Pricing, IsraelThis article focuses on governance of the pharmaceutical
sector in Israel. It traces the relationships between
the state, industry, and sick funds from before the
establishment of National Health Insurance (NHI) in
1995 to the beginning of this decade, in particular as
they have grappled with the challenge of rationalizing
pharmaceutical provision. Mainly as a result of the
introduction of NHI there have been shifts in the modes
and mix of governance over an extended time period.
The literature on pharmaceutical governance has
focused on State actors such as single-payer national
health systems and in the main on the regulatory tensions
with the interests of the research-based multinational
pharmaceutical industry [1-3]. In the case of Israel, the
role of non-State actors, that is of publicly-funded private
(not-for-profit) sick funds - as well as a pharmaceutical
sector dominated by generic industry interests - areCorrespondence: Saxp@netvision.net.il
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orspecial features that could add institutional diversity to
the international literature on governance regimes in the
health and pharmaceutical sectors. As such, the paper aims
to throw light on the multi-levelness of policy-making and
governance.
Israel’s health care system represents an interesting
laboratory for policy experiments, as it shares certain
key characteristics with many European countries, such
as competing sick funds and a commitment to principles
of equity and solidarity, though it is not encumbered by
supranational regulatory requirements common to the
EU [4]. Since the enactment of NHI, Israel has had
almost 20 years of consistent and cumulative experience
with the active management of an explicitly defined drug
benefits scheme and has established a distinct culture
and modus operandi that are worthy of study.
Within the context of the governance of the pharma-
ceutical sector I have chosen to focus on the making of
national formulary decisions. A core government policyis an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
rg/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited.
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interests of government, sick funds and a generic-based
industry coincide, at least to some extent. In the NHI era
Israel has achieved long-term success in cost-containment
[5], with the key factors including: a tight health budgetary
framework within NHI; a small number of dominant sick
funds; and comprehensive policies for generic medicines
[6,7]. Israel has had success in managing pharmaceutical
expenditures while maintaining universal access to
medically necessary pharmaceuticals since the introduction
of NHI.
On the other hand, the issue of equity has received
belated attention [6]. Only about 60% of pharmaceutical
expenditure in Israel is funded via NHI, with the balance
consisting of patient co-payments as well as purchases of
drugs (or their specific indications) not covered by the
NHI including OTC medicines.
The first section Concepts and theoretical issues of the
paper introduces concepts related to the shift in the gov-
ernance of the pharmaceutical sector, including the theory
of countervailing forces. The second section The Israel
case presents the Israeli case. The third section Discussion
discusses the successes and failures of the Israeli approach
to date and suggests ways forward. An Appendix presents
a descriptive analysis of the Israeli pharmaceutical industry
context, focusing on the local generic-based industry and
its role in the policy network.
Concepts and theoretical issues
The literature on trends in public sector governance
since the late 1990s notes that modes of governance have
become more complex. In addition to the hierarchies and
markets of the 1980s and 1990s, network arrangements
were identified. Increased system complexity renders
hierarchical modes inadequate over time [8,9]. There
is a need to engage in network modes of governance with
partners in a horizontal network to bring stakeholders
together for a common end. Health governance internation-
ally became more complex, with both hierarchical and
network modes of governance explicitly represented
within single public systems [8]. Barnett notes that,
while there has been a decline in market arrangements,
there is a persistence of hierarchical forms and greater
presence of organisational (and community) networks.
Tuohy [9] points out that, with increasing complexity of
technology and relationships, traditional vertical direc-
tives may no longer be adequate and governments
themselves may need a wider repertoire of skills, including
negotiation and persuasion, to manage interdependent
organisations and networks. In conceptualising the state-
industry- sick fund network, I draw upon Rhodes [10,11]
who argued for a definition which identifies governance as
referring to ‘self-organising, inter-organisational networks’
and which contains four features:■ interdependence between organisations;
■ continuing interactions between members of the
network;
■ game-like interrelationships and interactivities, that
are rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the
game negotiated and agreed by network participants.
■ a large degree of autonomy from the state.
Governance and coordination are nouns, and an analysis
that deploys these terms can sneak in an implicit assump-
tion that some sort of governance and coordination has
been achieved. However, the achievement of some requisite
level of governance and/or coordination in different set-
tings cannot be taken for granted. Rather than assuming
the achievement of governance, and asking what type(s)
are to be found, Tenbensel [12] suggested that analysis
of multiple modes can gain more traction by focusing
primarily on attempts to steer in the direction of any
perceived ideal types of governance. In order to bring
the political context into the foreground, it is useful to
think of each of the modes of steering as contingent upon
the mobilisation of particular types of power and
knowledge resources. The various modes of governance
and steering each require a different constellation of
power and knowledge. Therefore, shifts of emphasis from
one mode of steering to another require the gathering
of different types of knowledge and the deployment
of different power resources.
In this paper I try to capture and characterise the shifting
modes of governance in the Israeli health and pharmaceut-
ical sectors. I identify a shift from an unregulated market
arrangement in the pre-NHI era that shifted to a mainly
hierarchical mode of governance with the establishment of
the NHI funding reform of 1995, and which continued
through the early NHI “transition” years from 1995–1998.
In the decade and a half since there has been a long-term
shift from the mainly hierarchical mode to a mixture
of hierarchical and horizontal modes of governance
with the characteristic of a looser, more dispersed policy
network.
To understand how and why a policy network operates,
it is necessary to understand the unwritten constitution,
which guides the behaviour of government, industry and
sick funds towards each other and influences the strategic
deployment of their resources. Some of the rules can
be distinguished by what these actors say or write or
believe the rules to be. Other rules can be inferred
from their conduct to each other. Although there are
apparently no regular formal consultative arrangements
between the government and industry groups in Israel,
there are many informal exchanges, some of which take
place at the highest levels in the Ministry of Health
[MOH] and other government ministries (Treasury,
Industry, and Justice).
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the industry and the sick funds (the pharmaceutical
“sector”) over the last two decades I also draw on some
of the theoretical concepts used by Abraham [1], in his
investigation of the governance of the industry in the
context of the UK National Health System (NHS) since
the latter’s creation. In particular I draw upon the
concept of countervailing powers [13,14] to corporate
bias [15]. The theory of countervailing powers focuses on
the role played by a range of actors and the pressure they
exert, or fail to exert, to achieve or to block a dominant
party’s position. It has recently been applied to understand
the rapid growth of medicine use and the governance of
the pharmaceutical industry [16,17].
The Israel case
This section begins with a description of the Israeli
political economy context focusing on public policy and
the budgetary framework. This is followed by an analysis
of governance in the Israeli pharmaceutical sector within
the context of health insurance reform, referring to the
shifting modes of governance and the multi-levelness of
policy making and governance. The section then focuses
on governance arrangements in the management of the
NHI drug formulary (basket), in order to reflect on
how well pharmaceutical governance has fared in the
previous two decades and how the state has dealt
with and resolved conflicting interests in the key areas of
reimbursement and pricing. The section concludes with a
comparison of the governance and institutional approaches
taken by Israel and New Zealand, which has a central
pharmaceutical management agency in a single payer
NHS system.
Political economy and public policy context
Prior to NHI, the health care system was plagued by a
number of problems, the most relevant to this paper
were financial deficits and lack of clarity regarding
entitlements. The NHI Law was the main policy response
to these problems [18]. Three related factors that are key
to an understanding of the pharmaceutical sector in Israel
and its development are the role of central government,
the nature of the NHI reform and the reform’s impact on
the pharmaceutical sector.
Central government dominates Israel’s political economy
and the formation of public policy, with the Treasury being
traditionally very influential in policy making. There
has been a long-term central government focus on
fiscal consolidation, containing public expenditures in all
civilian areas including health, starting from around 1985
(Economic Recovery Programme). This was bolstered by
the country’s financial and political leadership for
most of the period since 1996. In the 1990s in particular
the Treasury became the “policeman” of the publicservices, vetoing potentially costly reforms of state
agencies and putting obstacles in the way of funding
costly legislation. In Israel’s policy-making network,
economic thinking has become preeminent in social
welfare policy and ideology, particularly since the
1990s. In Israel, as in other countries, social policy took
on a harder, neo-liberal edge to match the deregulation
policies of the late 1980s. Often a gap arose between
promises embedded in much of Israel’s welfare legislation
and its actual implementation [19].
In 1995 the NHI Law went into effect, creating
compulsory health insurance for all Israeli residents
by means of one of 4 existing sick funds of their
choice. The main goals of the law were to provide
universal health coverage; spell out residents’ rights to
a basic package of health services; promote increased
equity; assure the solvency of the healthcare system;
and give residents greater freedom of choice among
sick funds. A key plank of an earlier reform proposal
not incorporated into the NHI law, which remains on
the agenda till this day, was to absolve the MoH of
operational responsibility for the provision of health
services, thereby allowing MoH to devote more effort
to monitoring and regulating the system.
Although the 1995 NHI reform was a step forward in
the social welfare sense, with Israel catching up with
those of welfare state systems elsewhere, it was also a
funding reform giving the government for the first time
clear budgetary control of the health system. As imple-
mented, a main thrust of the NHI reform was to enhance
central government’s control over sick fund expenses in
order to constrain public expenditures [20]. Some argue
that government involvement in providing financial sup-
port to publicly-financed health services has continually
been eroded during this period. As is the case with basic
and comprehensive welfare legislation, the NHI Law
intrinsically affords substantial leeway for bureaucratic
or procedural judgement in its implementation by the
MOH and the sick funds [19].
In general, Israeli public policy has been influenced by
the paradigm of new public management (NPM). In the
health sphere, since implementation of NHI in 1995,
Israel has deployed a fairly comprehensive version of
regulated competition for health care services, with open
enrolment for citizens in four regulated, capitated sick
funds. Perhaps the most challenging aspect of the
regulated competition model, mandating and updating
a standard basket of health services, has been carried
out [21].
In the pharmaceutical policy domain, since the early
1990s and even before the introduction of NHI law,
government in Israel had become increasingly active. Not
only was it more active than in the past, but arguably for
most of the period government has also been more active
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areas of health policy. This has particularly been the
case following the introduction of NHI in 1995, which cast
the government, especially the MOH and the Treasury,
in a much more central role as regulator in the
pharmaceutical policy domain. In the early days, as
now, a major policy concern has been the relentless
growth in expenditure on prescribed medicines as a
stream of new and costly therapies came onto the
market. However, it was only with the establishment of
NHI and the health services basket in the mid-1990s, that
the cost of medicines and the issue of ensuring affordable
access really became a focus of concerted public policy
attention. With the government commitment under NHI
to guarantee universal access to a defined basket of health
services within a defined budget, prescription medicines
were caught up in the emerging financial arrangements
underpinning public health services in Israel. Public
uproar over failure to update the basket and Treasury
efforts to leave the determination of benefits to the sick
funds, led in 1998 to a unique government involvement
followed by a (near-total) commitment since then to
provide an extra budget for annual update of the national
basket of health services and the reimbursement of new
drugs. At the same time the Treasury initiated legislation
to formalize co-payments for services covered in the
basket and this was approved by parliament.
From market (pre-NHI) to hierarchical (since NHI) mode of
governance
Before 1995, in the pre-NHI period, a market-based
mode of governance was dominant, characterised by
non-regulated competition between the sick funds.
Traditionally in this period the MOH shared decision-
making powers with the Clalit sick fund, mainly because
of its dominance (then a 75-80% share of overall sick fund
membership) and its political ties with the Histadrut
(labour union) and Labour governments. The Treasury
was also a powerful co-player but in this era the financial
accountability mechanisms were loose.
As noted above, the increasing financial instability of the
health system in the 1980s and early 1990s, particularly in
the Clalit sick fund, highlighted the need for a more
managed and regulated mode of governance. The NHI
health reform of 1995 drew on the rhetoric of managed
competition, but rather than fostering competition, the
main thrust of the NHI reforms was to enhance central
government control over sick fund expenses in order to
constrain government expenditures [20]. The result was a
dependence of sick funds on central government funding
and a more transparent hierarchy of Treasury over MOH
and of MOH over sick funds. In the pre-NHI era the
boundary between policy and service provision was often
blurred; in the NHI era this boundary became clearer, withgovernment responsible for policy and the sick funds for
service provision. The introduction of a clear budgetary
framework for the NHI and the public health care system
forced sick funds to adopt better management tools
in order to run more efficiently (and possibly more
effectively). The government increased its regulatory
powers over the sick funds, particularly over Clalit.
The voice of the sick funds became more expressed in
operational management and implementation of policies
decided at the State level. Clalit (and the other sick funds)
remained a partner in policy negotiations, but Clalit no
longer had veto power. Till this day the sick funds are not
organised into a formal association which jointly and
legally represents their interests and those of their
members vis-a-vis government and regulators. This is
opposed by both MOH and the Treasury - formally on
antitrust considerations so as, it is claimed, to protect
patient rights.
The introduction of NHI also promoted the government,
that is, both MOH and the Treasury, to a much more
central and active role as regulator in the drug policy
domain. Previously, it was limited to medicines registration
and price control. The state via the NHI had now become
responsible also for the issue of universal access to a
defined basket of health care services. In response to
government concerns about equity and access there
evolved greater MOH control of pharmaceutical services.
Central policy and guidelines were introduced that were
to underpin government desire for consistency of access
and services, and these were maintained by mechanisms
such as national policies mainly administered by the
MoH’s Medical Administration and budgetary and
financial accountability provisions carried out by the
MoH’s Division of Supervision and Control of Sick funds.
Mixed modes of governance (hierarchical and network) in
the NHI era
In the NHI era Israel appears to have structured regulatory
reform to protect valued institutional arrangements such
as the sick funds whilst at the same time creating and then
maintaining critical government capacities. Government
has been concerned to preserve, not to destabilise or
to significantly restrict, freedom of institutional capacities
and competencies. The NHI funding reform was charac-
terised by a determination and commitment to keep to
the existing institutional configuration. Government has
taken care that the reform has not affected the autonomy
of the sick funds to keep and develop their own organisa-
tion models. The key characteristic of the loosely dispersed
pharmaceutical policy network is that there is (clear) direct
government control coupled with a decentralised policy
implementation process, which can apply a commercial
market management approach. Government leaves the sick
funds substantial commercial freedom to negotiate with
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of NHI there are no budgeting goals for pharmaceutical
expenditures, this has allowed the government to succeed
in fulfilling its core objective of containing pharmaceutical
costs. Sick funds apply formulary management practices
that include: specifying which of the available reimbursable
products or brands may be prescribed; securing price
discounts for drugs purchased; and where appropriate
specifying conditions under which a physician may
prescribe certain drugs for patients.
At the same time as protecting institutional arrange-
ments, there has been also a rise in government technical
competency which has brought reforms in key aspects of
pharmaceutical policy, for example encouragement of
the provision and use of generics to reduce costs and
introduction of international (external) price referencing.
The new national policy equilibrium required major
change in the MOH. In addition to its traditional
drug registration (market authorisation) and pricing
control activities it has had to create new technical
infrastructures (scientific, technical and economic), includ-
ing health technology assessment (HTA) and the use of
evidence-based medicine in reimbursement and associated
national prescribing guidelines; supervision, mainly
financial, of sick funds’ activities.
NHI and the rationalization of pharmaceutical provision
Prior to the introduction of NHI in 1995, there was a lack
of a clear national policy regarding reimbursement and
priority setting for access to new drugs and technologies.
Each sick fund had its own formulary. Decision making
on what would be included in the formularies was mainly
the outcome of negotiations between each of the sick
funds and the commercial sponsor of each new drug. Sick
fund formularies were not widely distributed and
guidelines regarding their formation or update were
not publicly available or discussed. In the pre-NHI
era, priority setting by the private sick funds took
place within a competitive insurer market that was
not regulated or subject to government supervision.
The drug formulary could be used by sick funds, if they
wished, to select against high–risk patients. Industry’s
efforts to attain formulary inclusion were mainly
addressed at top sick fund management as well as at
opinion and thought leaders in the medical profession
working in sick funds and in hospitals. Connections
between sponsors and members of the early policy elite
(Clalit sick fund–Histadrut labour union-Labour Party)
could be used to overcome problems or resistance. In the
absence of strong budgetary control by the government
over the sick funds at that time and in the context of
a competitive sick fund market, sick funds had little
incentive to exclude new drugs and technologies; critically
this applied to the dominant sick fund Clalit which waslosing market share. The “bill” in any case would be
picked up by government which eventually had to bail
out the Clalit on more than one occasion. In 1994 it
was the Clalit’s dire financial situation that led to the
establishment of the NHI.
The NHI basket of services specifies procedures and
drugs and indications for use of these services. Although
there is a common list of drugs to be covered under
NHI, sick funds operate their own formularies. NHI
gives parliament the right to remove items from the
basket, and to add items on condition that budgets are
made available by the government (implying agreement
between the MOH and treasury) to cover the anticipated
costs [21].
During the transition period of 1995–8 - whilst NHI
was already in place but before the precedence of extra
funding for new drugs and the establishment of national
HTA, leading local companies succeeded in getting new
expensive treatments for multiple sclerosis added to the
basket. This was achieved in spite of an internal
MOH economic assessment that spelled out the low
cost-effectiveness of these treatments, which at that
time were unproven in terms of efficacy, and in spite
of the substantial budgetary implication of including
them. In addition to the strenuous lobbying of these
companies, pressure was also generated by claims in
the courts mainly against the MOH and the sick
funds for access to these treatments. The sick funds,
which were formally absent from the closed debate
within the MOH on this issue, were left to fund these
treatments.
In 1998 a Public Committee was established for the
first time in order to consider the addition of new
services to the basket, with the Treasury appearing
(with hindsight) to provide an annual increment of
about 1% to the known cost of the basket for this
purpose. The list of services, mainly pharmaceuticals,
seeking inclusion in the basket far exceeds the available
funding. The creation of this MOH-appointed Committee
was designed, perhaps, to provide insulation for the MOH
and government. The committee meets several times over
a few months each year in order to discuss technologies
which have been selected and ranked for prioritisation
earlier in the year by internal non-transparent MoH
procedures.
The update process in Israel is unique. In most of the
Western world the inclusion of each specific technology
is assessed sequentially, within the context of the annual
health services budget. In contrast, in Israel, assessment
of hundreds of technologies (ca 400 annually, a majority
of which are resubmissions) competing with each other
are carried out at the same time. The process of updating
the basket essentially involves choosing between drugs
that are not alternatives for treating the same clinical
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extra monies determined and budgeted for this purpose.
A major consideration in decision making is centered on
the highly uncertain assessment of budget impact in
the short to medium term. This approach tends to
marginalise, at least in the public space, the key issue
of what is the therapeutic advantage (marginal clinical
effectiveness in relation to more established medications)
of a candidate drug and of the quality of evidence to
support it. The process begins with a ranking of potential
new services, based on HTAs performed internally by the
MOH and which is presented in summary form by it to
the committee. The committee, which is made up of
physicians, MOH representatives, a representative of each
of the four sick funds, Treasury representative(s), and
public representatives (2–3 with backgrounds in ethics,
religion and law) then deliberates based on various ethical,
economic and social criteria in order to arrive at a final
ranking and a decision as to which services will be
included within the available extra budget. Patient
organisations and industry are not represented directly on
the committee. There is lack of transparency and public
access is limited to invited media. It is virtually impossible
to follow the proceedings, particularly at the level of a
specific technology. The media could be considered as a
potential countervailing force in a debate regarding
funding decision. However this potential is not realised;
apart from the enormous complexity of following
committee discussions, this potential is weakened due
to the media’s underlying message that the NHI basket
is basic and insufficient and that more funding is the
solution.
In notable cases involving cancer drugs, such as Herceptin
(trastuzumab) and Avastin (bevacizumab), pressure exerted
by lobby groups and politicians overcame, apparently, the
inclination of the committee based on HTA [21]. Moreover,
the level of funding varies substantially from year to
year, and the decisions of the committee are subject to
Cabinet approval, such that the process [22], according to
Chinitz [21], “remains a mix, sometimes unstable but still
impressive, of science and politics [22-24]”.
Governance arrangements in reimbursement and pricing
In the NHI era, government has become a stronger part
of an inter-organisational network of pharmaceutical
governance consisting of key self-organised participants,
industry and sick funds, groups that accept government
authority within the network of governance. Survival of
the network requires management of a range of difficult
and politically volatile stakeholder relationships. Negotiation
and accommodation, flexibility and trusting relationships
are requisites of this network and help to ensure its survival.
In the increasing complexity of reimbursement decision
making since 1998, the role of these stakeholders hasbeen strengthened. Sick funds have privileged access
to and influence over the state in funding decisions. With
access to HTA within the MOH and a representative of
each sick fund on the committee (and also on its more
exclusive key economic sub-committee) they are able to
influence which drugs get added to the basket and under
what conditions and restrictions.
The presence of sick funds helps to keep reimbursement
decisions at a distance from the political arena. For
instance, the government reimbursement process itself
does not get involved in cases involving exceptional
circumstances; such cases fall under the discretion of the
sick funds which have had to set up their own “exception”
committees [25].
As the MOH’s HTA and the committee cannot hold
all the required competencies and information internally,
they require the technical support, information and
expertise provided by stakeholders; the involvement of
industry (the main proposer and provider of HTAs) and
sick funds helps to guarantee the legitimacy of the
final assessment and helps to prevent conflict after the
technologies have entered the market.
The drug industry has no formal access to the
decision-making process in the committee and there is no
appeal process. This lack of access is not a crucial matter
for the local generic-based industry (see Appendix), as
most submissions are made by multinationals and their
local representatives. Nevertheless, the survival of the
network also requires keeping on-side two influential
stakeholders – the research-based multinational
pharmaceutical industry and the medical profession.
This has meant recognising innovation and managing
the tension this creates vis-à-vis cost control objectives.
Keeping both stakeholders on-side was facilitated by the
extra budgets allocated for the annual updating of the
drug basket. There are also several features of the process
for updating the list which indicate that government
wishes to avoid confrontation with “Big Pharma”. These
include: no prior price negotiations (thus implicitly
delinking price premium with degree of innovation
such as therapeutic advantage); not stating the grounds
for non-inclusion; and automatic resubmission in the next
cycle without having to address issues raised earlier
(such as high prices and inadequate evidence base). The
process was set up in the period when the government
had to defend its policy regarding patent law amendments
favouring the Israeli generic industry from strident
criticism particularly in the USA capital, and the threat of
sanctions from “Big Pharma”.
In a comparative analysis of institutional design in
several countries including Israel, Maor [26] classified
national drug reimbursement agencies based on the
level of independence of the reimbursement mechan-
ism and the quality of drug evaluation. Dividing these
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adversarial, trust and near- trust - Maor suggested that each
model represents a distinct way in which governments can
use institutional devices to manage the risks related to
agency reputation. He concluded that Israel’s reimburse-
ment agency is a classic example of a “trust” model
which he characterised as being less independent from
government ministries and as having less demanding
standards of drug evaluation. In Israel the guidelines for
clinical and cost- effectiveness evaluation do not represent
a demand that companies demonstrate comparative
therapeutic advantage. There is no indication of the
preferred type of study, type of participant, type of
interventions or type of outcome measures. The guidelines
implicitly encourage the submission of the best available
data or evidence without prescribing the type of evidence
or data that is deemed acceptable [26].
Although the innovativeness of many new drugs is
dubious, and many new drugs offer little health benefit
(‘me-too’ drugs) beyond what is currently available,
manufacturers will typically – and by business necessity
must – claim innovation [27]. However, government
involvement in the basket update process and in the
prior and separate regulation of drug prices (by means of
external reference pricing, ERP) does not constrain the
prices of new products and thus it cannot be accused of
not rewarding claims of innovation. New cancer drugs are
often reimbursed earlier in Israel at prices similar or
higher than in England and elsewhere [28]. Israel is
prepared to recognise and pay the price of innovation, not
least because of the political risk of not doing so in
the case of a government-controlled non-independent
reimbursement agency [26]. In the absence of price
negotiation before a new drug is added to the basket
the government is tacitly agreeing to high prices of
new products in its funding decisions; such a policy can
delay and sometimes prevent the inclusion of drugs.
Although the market approval process is separate
from the HTA and the reimbursement process, they
are institutionally linked in as much as they are carried
out by the same internal directorate in the MOH. In
recent years there has been a pattern of the MOH issuing
market approval in some cases only after the drug
has become reimbursable.
With regard to pricing, a corporate bias has been
dominant in the regulation of drug prices, permitting
the industry to have privileged access and influence over
government on this issue - access not afforded to other
interest groups. ERP was introduced in 2001, linking
drug prices to high-priced reference countries in Europe.
At the same time ERP in Israel uniquely links the prices
of generic drugs to original brand prices, and these listed
prices- and not the discounted prices negotiated by the
sick funds- form the basis on which co-payments leviedby the sick funds, with MOH approval, are determined.
Whereas, in the two decades before ERP was introduced,
sick funds were a countervailing influence mobilised
then to support government moves to price reform, they
have since become aligned with the industry. Furthermore,
in the competitive sick fund market there is little chance
that sick funds will use their potential countervailing power
against the reality of high prices being sought for moderate
benefits by a drug’s commercial sponsor. In the absence of
the MOH fulfilling its potential as a countervailing
influence, and of any countervailing influence from
the dominant sick funds in working against structural
price distortions, the weakening of the regulation of
price by corporate bias continues. The maintenance
of the current price regulatory system since 2001 is
testimony to the reluctance of the state to a price
control system that better protects the interests of
the NHI over and above the interests of the industry
and the sick funds [29].
Medical profession and disease-focused patient groups
Due to the non-transparency of the HTA process it is
not clear to what extent submissions by sponsors are
subject to independent review and critique as distinct
from clarification from non-independent clinical specialists,
sick funds and the sponsor. Independent scientific experts
could act as a countervailing power to a sponsor that hopes
to achieve a high ranking from the MOH’s HTA. On the
other hand, in the absence of challenge by scientists and
regulators to the power of manufacturers in funding
decisions, this signifies some degree of corporate bias
[30]. In the case of Herceptin lobbying and politicians
overcame, apparently, the inclination of the professional
committee based on HTA [21].
Enlarging the evidence-based medicine aspect, an integral
part of HTA, does legitimise the cost-containing side of the
reimbursement process as it is consistent with best practice
and so keeps the medical community on-side. It also
reflects an alignment of managerial and clinical rationali-
ties, so that doctors are enrolled into a system of govern-
ance. In its management of the drug benefit scheme, the
state is placed in opposition to the medical professions’ con-
cerns about clinical autonomy. Those concerns encourage
the industry to assimilate the medical profession as
an ally in the industry’s quest to undermine those elements
of the state (e.g., HTA) having countervailing effects. This,
in addition to industry’s ability to mobilise alliances of
organised groups of patients, to use courts, and to
gain privileged access to government, helps to frustrate
the state’s objectives, redirecting them more in line with
industry interests.
Furthermore, industry’s creation of “assimilated allies”
with an ideological assault on the consciousness of
the medical profession - what doctors learn regarding
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leaders in “continuing medical education”, what they learn
from biased medical journals and what they absorb from
company representatives and advertisements - has pro-
moted “pharmaceuticalisation” [1] inside and outside
the NHI. (Outside the framework of the NHI basket
these processes have thrived, aided by the widespread
diffusion of more market-based supplementary insurance).
Not all pharmaceuticalisation is contrary to the interests
of health or the NHI, but some of it can be. The assault
is so pervasive that it may be difficult for busy doctors to
distinguish ideology about drugs from valid knowledge - all
the more so if their patients are demanding particular drugs
(recommended by industry-supported patient groups and
the media). The growing “pharmaceuticalisation” and con-
sumerism has expanded physicians’ prescribing horizon
outside the NHI, making difficult the distinction between
rational prescribing based on collective health priorities and
promotional claims for the therapeutic value of new
products. The twin processes of pharmaceuticalisation and
consumerism have predominantly served to assimilate the
potential countervailing powers of the medical profession
and patients into allies of corporate bias in governance [1].
Comparing governance and institutional approaches-
Israel and New Zealand
This trend towards increasingly hierarchical modes of
governance has also been the experience of New Zealand
as well as a number of other small countries or jurisdic-
tions, most notably those with a clear regional or local
system of governance [8]. However unlike many Western
developed countries, (including small-sized ones), central
government in Israel has little local/regional control over
most health services. In Israel the sick funds, rather than
local or regional governments, manage the health services
directly. One consequence of the lack of accountability to
peripheral areas has been a growing level of health
inequality in the NHI era.
Both Israel and New Zealand seem to have succeeded
in cost-containment, but the two countries have taken
different institutional approaches. In Israel there is a
dispersed policy network in a multi - payer NHI system,
whereas, in New Zealand, Pharmac was established as a
central management agency in a single - payer NHS
system. Pharmac’s key to success as a manager of a capped
budget is considered to be due to the combination of
governance arrangements independent of direct govern-
ment control and a decision-making methodology that
employs consistent and widely accepted assessment
techniques, features that seem to be distinctive of compar-
able agencies elsewhere in the world [3]. In Israel, the
government has left all matters related to actual drug
pricing to the four sick funds. After a decision by the
basket of services committee, sick funds are free tonegotiate with the drug suppliers as well as to employ
any supply-side strategies that they see fit. However
aggressive sick fund supply-side strategies may be, the
outcome, in terms of efficient government subsidies
and hence low drug prices, according to Maor [26] does
not come close to the situation whereby a national
purchasing mechanism, such as Pharmac, employs similar
strategies. Although a key measure undertaken in both
countries is tendering for sole supply rights, examples of
procedures undertaken by Pharmac but not by the Israeli
reimbursement agency are:
■ Refusing to list a new drug for public financing
unless it undercuts the price of the existing
reference drugs.
■ Refusing to include a new drug if it is deemed that
the market is sufficiently provided for.
On the demand side, Israel’s MOH, unlike Pharmac, has
not needed to expand its role into demand management,
leaving it to sick funds; prescribers’ education is mainly
undertaken by the four sick funds that employ doctors.
Discussion
This analysis suggests that a relatively complex mix of
hierarchical and network modes of health governance
has been successfully established over an extended
period of time when flexibility is maintained through the
implementation process. The system for defining and
updating a standard basket of drugs has coped well
with the challenge of managing a range of difficult
and potentially volatile stakeholder relationships as well as
distancing ministers from controversies of funding and list-
ing decisions. Government has succeeded in containing
drug costs whilst still maintaining a basket of reimbursable
drugs that, in an international perspective, is technologically
advanced.
On the other hand, it has coped less favourably in
the area of financial access and equity to health care
services for all citizens. Network arrangements in the
Israel pharmaceutical sector also appear to have delayed
the introduction of, or hindered, suitable accountability
relationships, such as monitoring how sick funds have
spent the extra funds allocated for basket update [31] and
the extent of patients’ sharing of cost of drug treatments
in the basket [32]. The lack of regional governance - there
is no devolution of powers to regions in Israel’s health
policy - means that there is no regional accountability on
health care spending. The state has traditionally played,
with little transparency and to the detriment of a more
pluralistic access to decision making, an intermediary role
between unavoidable corporate interests of industry and
sick funds. Institutional and governance arrangements in
Israel appear to limit the potential and/or incentive of the
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in subsidy and other decisions. In NHI, provision for real
public accountability of pharmaceutical development and
regulation remains bleak in a government-industry-sick
fund complex that lacks transparency and a regulatory
system whose public rights of access to information
lag behind many other regimes in the West and other
developed countries.
One of the effects of corporate bias has been a shift in
policy away from regulation in the interests of patients
and public health to prioritisation of the interests of the
regulatees (industry, sick funds) instead e.g. prices,
prescription co-payments as well as supplementary
insurance outside the NHI. This focus on pharma-
ceuticals has diverted or delayed attention away from
non-pharmaceutical needs e.g. dental health, long-term
nursing care, mental health which were not included in
the NHI basket of services. The “idea of innovation” has
its success in that update of the basket was seen mainly
technologically and pharmaceutically thus arguably de-
laying or preventing expansion of health services into
these areas. These require establishing their own
governance arrangements that do not have the unifying
value of the idea of innovation that characterises
governance of the pharmaceutical sector.
Appendix: Pharmaceutical sector and industry
context
Government has multifaceted and often conflicting roles
in its relationship with the pharmaceutical domain:
industry’s regulator (drug approvals and safety, prices);
industry’s sponsor (promoting industrial competitive-
ness); and industry’s customer (government–owned hos-
pitals). In addition, as the ultimate source of financing, it
serves as a reimbursement agency (universal access and
co-payments) and is deeply involved in supervision of
the sick funds (budgets and efficiency). These multiple
roles, combined with the complex set of interrelating
regulations through which the regulatory process occurs,
lead to a predisposition for negotiation in considering
regulatory alternatives and trade-offs among policy
areas. The common thread across the areas of product
safety regulation, health policy and support of industry
expansion is a trust-based exchange among a narrow
range of stakeholders, with a blurring of public-private
boundaries. As Lewis and Abraham have noted, in the
more neo-liberal regulatory state that has developed, the
State has become more responsive to and convergent
with industrial interests; consequently, it has less to
bargain with and about [33]. There has to be an informal
atmosphere of trust between regulators and industry.
With increasing government involvement and activism
in health and drug policy in the NHI era, the extent of
industry’s freedom from government action continues tobe limited. On the other hand, industry, with a stake in
all aspects of pharmaceutical policy and regulation,
draws upon unique resources, such as expertise and
lobbying capacity.
An examination of the very limited access to Israel’s
process of pharmaceutical regulation (approvals and safety;
prices) afforded to consumers, health professionals and
other non-industry interests, reveals how limited pluralism
is in the sector. Israel’s pharmaceutical regulation is much
closer to corporatism, with all the trappings of social
closure, than to pluralism. For example, in Israel expert
advisory meetings on medicine regulatory matters are
closed to outside scrutiny, in stark contrast to the FDA and
closer to the EMEA model. By and large, the industry has
been entrusted with regulatory compliance.
Pharmaceutical systems in different countries seem
very different in terms of structure and organisation, and
in most cases these differences stem from historical
reasons where the weight of the local pharmaceutical
industry plays a role. The Israeli pharmaceutical sector
is characterised by the smallness of the domestic market
and the presence of a large generic-based domestic
industry that has become relatively influential in relation to
the research-based multinational pharmaceutical industry.
Subsidiaries of research-based companies were established
relatively late in Israel, mainly during the decade start-
ing from the mid-1990s. The influence of multinational
pharmaceutical companies derives ultimately from their
international mobility. In Israel their influence is in any case
limited as they confine themselves mainly to market-
ing activities: they have no large-scale investments in
the country, focusing mainly on small-scale clinical
trials and the search for and acquisition of usually
early-phase health care technologies.
Pharmaceutical industry activity in Israel, for much of its
history, consisted of secondary formulation and packaging
and importing activities, with limited capacity to influence
policy and to enhance national policies aimed at support-
ing it. Since the 1990s the sectoriality of the drug industry
operating in Israel became more clear–cut between local
manufacturers, mainly of generics, and local subsidiaries of
research-based multinational industry (involved in import-
ing and marketing). This made it easier for regulators to
identify and align with the core interests of the local
generic-based pharmaceutical industry which has also
become a positive contributor to the national balance
of trade. Thus one would expect that some development
of polices in the pharmaceutical sector would reflect a
“tailoring” of policies suitable to this generic-based local
industry.
As the political economic context changed, governance
of the Israel pharmaceutical sector has evolved to a
distinctive neo-corporate mode of negotiation and
accommodation. Regulatory “hostility” seen in the past
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[34]), has been replaced by a more sympathetic environ-
ment with pharmaceutical policy increasingly formulated
within a ‘state-capital’ partnership. Industry has steadily
gained greater access to the government agencies that
shape pharmaceutical policy, increasing its opportunities
to interact with decision makers and pressing forward its
ideas and claims. The partnership approach has resulted
in a number of significant government initiatives explicitly
aimed at meeting the interests and concerns of industry.
Most significant were major Patent Law reforms in 1995
and 2008, which were explicit government recognition of
the need to provide a supportive environment for the
generic industry as one of the larger industrial activities in
Israel. Another has been the preferential tax arrange-
ments given to national export champions such as that
provided most generously to Israel’s leading pharmaceut-
ical exporter.
The global pharmaceutical enterprise has flourished,
and research-based manufacturers – acting both indi-
vidually and through organised, transnational business
networks – have gained considerable political influence
within national and supra-national organisations [27]. If
once neglected by Israeli regulators [34], the interests of
the multinational globally integrated pharmaceutical in-
dustry have also become impossible to ignore. In most
countries, strong government commitment to cost-
containment has the potential to create a tense relation-
ship with industry. In Israel, because of the generic-based
manufacturing nature of the local industry there is argu-
ably less tension than might otherwise be the case. The
Israel government can get closer to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry and still retain its autonomy and authority, and
allow sick fund monopsony power to constrain drug
expenditure. In general, the pharmaceutical industry uses
the argument that cost containment is ‘toxic’ to the idea
of innovation and thus to a country’s prospect of
economic growth. But in Israel, the country’s economic
growth is perceived to be also tied to the wellbeing of a
strong generic (export-based) industry.Competing interests
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